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VIETNAM: CAN AN EFFECTIVE ARBITRATION SYSTEM EXIST?
I. INTRODUCTION
Located within the Tropic Zone in Southeast Asia, Vietnam's
agricultural potential, abundant unexploited natural resources, 1
long coastline of mysterious and exotic landscape, and large,
inexpensive, and diligent labor force2 provide attractive incentives
for foreign investors. Although these images are inviting to
investors, Vietnam's unstable government strips the country of its
appeal.
The instability of Vietnam's government creates various
problems for foreign investors. They are "discouraged by high
entry and start-up costs, ever-shifting rules and regulations,
avarious corruption, a minefield of cultural misunderstandings,
and an intensely nationalist system that seems unwilling to allow
foreigners to make a profit."'3 Additionally, because private
parties in international business transactions prefer arbitration for
dispute resolution,4 the lack of effective dispute resolution
mechanisms is a concern. 5
Arbitration is a private procedure in which parties voluntarily
submit their disputes to a neutral third party arbitrator or arbitral
1. Camellia Ngo, Note, Foreign Investment Promotion: Thailand as a Model for
Economic Development in Vietnam, 16 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 67, 71 (1992).
"The nation's energy reserves, including coal, natural gas, and petroleum offer
encouraging investment returns." Id at 67-68. For example, "while a number of gas finds
have been made, Vietnam's gas industry is in embryonic form. In 1997, Wood
Consultants Ltd. estimated Vietnam's remaining commercial reserves at more than 1.2
billion bbl of oil, and 3.8 tcf of gas." Exploration Sags Off Vietnam, OIL & GAS J., Nov. 3,
1997, at 32.
2. For example, "Vietnam's large population and cheap labor was enough to
convince [the Mitsubishi Corporation] that by just being there it would make money."
Mark R. Mitchell, Lessons from Vietnam, WORLD TRADE, Nov. 1997, at 18, 19.
3. Ken Stier, In Search of Direction, ASIAN BUS. (Hong Kong), Dec. 1997, at 30, 30.
Stier states that "a common complaint is the inconsistent application of regulations."
Additionally, there is the problem of the "broad discretionary powers enjoyed by local
officials, which stems from an attitude that the power of the emperor stops at the village
gates." Id at 31.
4. See Michael F. Hoellering, Managing International Commercial Arbitration: The
Institution's Role, DISP. RESOL. J., June 1994, at 12.
5. See Note, Protection of Foreign Direct Investment in a New World Order,
Vietnam-A Case Study, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1995 (1994) [hereinafter Protection].
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panel. 6 Although private parties prefer to use arbitration to settle
disputes, many countries may not feel the same. For example,
after the arbitrator or arbitration board has rendered a decision,
the host country may decide not to enforce that decision. 7 This
occurs in countries such as Vietnam, where "no one can count on
the government to honor a contract and there is no recourse to
objective arbitration."' 8 This can lead to "corruption 'from top to
bottom' because officials may demand a bribe to live up to what
they have already promised."9
This Comment contends that an effective arbitration system
cannot exist in Vietnam until Vietnam reforms its legal system.
Part II introduces the theory of arbitration and describes the
current trends in international arbitration, focusing on the means
of enforcing an international arbitration award.
Part III provides a general background of Vietnam, leading up
to its current condition. It also discusses important factors for
doing business in Vietnam, such as investment vehicles, and it
highlights the effect of Vietnam's Law on Foreign Investment on
foreign investors.
Part IV examines Vietnam's current dispute resolution
system. It examines Vietnam's arbitration system and the reasons
for its ineffectiveness. It focuses on the unpredictable or lack of
local enforcement, and on the inadequate security for the
recognition of foreign arbitration awards provided by Vietnam's
foreign investment laws.
Part V suggests methods foreign investors may use within the
current ineffective Vietnamese arbitration system. It discusses
possible actions foreign investors should take to protect
themselves against the possibility of an unenforceable arbitral
award.
6. See Robert Fischer et al., International Commercial Disputes Drafting an
Enforceable Arbitration Agreement, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 867, 943 (1996).
7. For example, "in Vietnam's nationalistic atmosphere, few are willing to risk a
final judgment being made against their position. It is also unclear if arbitration
decisions-foreign or domestic-can be enforced in Vietnam." Stier, supra note 3, at 34.
8. CLAIRBORNE PELL, U.S. SEN., REPORT ON THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS
COMMITTEE TRIP TO TAIWAN, VIETNAM, INDONESIA AND EAST TIMOR, MAY 25, 1996
THROUGH JUNE 2, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8788879 at *9.
9. Id. For example, one seasoned observer says: "All these decrees require more
paperwork, and more permits and licensing because of the government's control mania.
For each one, you need approval from an official who is not paid enough, but who has lots
of discretionary authority, so naturally you are guaranteeing more corruption. The
system is avalanching in this direction." Stier, supra note 3, at 34.
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Part VI suggests steps that Vietnam should take to create a
stable legal system, one that will encourage foreign investment. It
suggests measures Vietnam should adopt to emerge from its status
as a high-risk country to one at the forefront of the Asian
market.10
II. ARBITRATION-THE CUTTING EDGE IN INTERNATIONAL
DISPUTE SETITLEMENT
When drafting an international business agreement, dispute
settlement is an important issue to consider. Litigation and
arbitration are the most common dispute resolution processes. 11
While litigation may be the most common method to solve
disputes, adjudicating the matter in court does not always
represent the best alternative as "litigation is usually much more
expensive, time consuming, psychologically taxing and adversarial
than arbitration. ' 12 In addition, "litigation is subject exclusively to
the domestic laws of the country where the lawsuit is brought.'
13
Furthermore, differences in custom, language, and culture may
potentially result in a biased judgment against foreign investors.
14
Many foreign investors, therefore, avoid litigating in a foreign
judicial forum.
In the last few decades, arbitration has become the preferred
method of dispute resolution. 15 The advantages of arbitration are
that it provides a "neutral, private, predictable, and cost-effective
mechanism to settle private international business disputes."'1 6 In
addition, parties can choose the applicable law, the arbitration
10. For example:
American officials will be scrutinizing Vietnam's market reforms in the coming
months, when the two countries will negotiate important trade agreements,
including treaties for the elimination of double taxation and guaranteed
protection investment. Successful implementation of new policies will also be a
factor in U.S. congressional debates over whether to grant Vietnam Most
Favored Nation status, which would bring tariffs on Vietnamese imports to
America in line with those levied on products from most other countries in the
world.
Mitchell, supra note 2, at 18.
11. Jane L. Volz et al., Foreign Arbitral Awards: Enforcing the Award Against the
Recalcitrant Loser, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 867, 870 (1996).
12. Id.
13. Id (stating that "if you are a foreigner, bias, whether real or imagined looms over
the process.").
14. See id.
15. See id. at 868.
16. Id. at 869.
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forum, and the arbitrators. 17 The selected arbitrators are often
experts in the particular area of business in dispute. 18 This
flexibility is significant when dealing with a nation known for its
inefficient and corrupt judicial system. The ability to arbitrate will
often ease a foreign investor's concerns about a biased judgment.
An effective arbitral system is essential to a nation's
international business dealings.19 Foreign investors feel more
secure with their investments when the countries with which they
do business resolve disputes in a just manner. Therefore, many
countries have recently expanded or revised their international
arbitration laws or ratified arbitration treaties to attract more
foreign business. 20
Although other dispute resolution mechanisms exist (such as
negotiation, conciliation,21 and mediation), arbitration is the only
alternative dispute resolution process that can be binding and
enforceable on parties. 22 Certain countries, however, choose not
to enforce the arbitral judgment against parties.23 Moreover,
many countries require specific forms of dispute resolution in
certain business situations, thus, arbitration is not always an
option.24  If the choice exists, however, most parties choose
arbitration. 25
17. See id.
18. See id
19. See W. Lawrence Craig, Some Trends and Developments in the Laws and Practice
of International Commercial Arbitration, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 57 (1995).
20. See id.
21. Conciliation is a process in which the contracting parties invite another third
party, one who is usually familiar with the parties and their dispute, or an institution, to
help them negotiate a settlement. See Steven J. Burton, Combining Conciliation with
Arbitration of International Commercial Disputes, 18 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
637,638 (1995).
22. See id. at 810.
23. See supra note 8. Additionally, in China, even if the local court may order the
enforcement of the arbitration award, "the local legal community may be reluctant to
liquidate a debtor because of the social and economic costs of such action." Why
International Legal Practitioners Fear China, INT'L COM. LITIG. (London), Jul/Aug 1997,
at 39, 40 [hereinafter Fear China].
24. For example, a business cooperation agreement between either foreign-invested
enterprises or the foreign parties and Vietnamese government agencies permits
conciliation and litigation as the only dispute resolution mechanisms. No alternative
method of resolution is allowed. See Robert L. Wunker, The Laws of Vietnam Affecting
Foreign Investment, 28 INT'L LAW. 363, 381-82 (1994).
25. See Craig, supra note 19, at 2 (stating that by "mid-1980's, at least, it had become
recognized that arbitration was the normal way of settlement.").
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A. The Arbitral Process
There exists two distinct arbitral proceedings between which
parties may choose: the institutional arbitration and the ad hoc
arbitration.26 In an institutional arbitration, parties "conduct [the]
arbitration in accordance with the procedural rules of the
particular institution concerned. '27 A variety of international and
regional arbitration institutions exist, such as the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), Court of Arbitration, and the Euro-
Arab Arbitration System.28 In an ad hoc arbitration, parties can
specify all aspects of arbitration, including rules of procedure,
applicable law, place of arbitration, and other arbitral issues.
29
Whether the parties prefer the procedure of an arbitral
organization or of their own make-up, the enforceability of the
award remains the most critical issue.30 Without a guarantee of
enforceability, arbitration becomes meaningless.
31
B. Enforcement of an Arbitration Award
A treaty is an effective method to ensure the enforcement of
an arbitration award. One of the most effective treaties in this
area is the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York
Convention).32 This Convention provides a legal basis for most
international arbitration today.33 Approximately ninety countries
have ratified the New York Convention and more than one
hundred are signatories.34
The New York Convention strives to liberalize the
procedures used to enforce foreign arbitral awards,35 and is
applicable to both commercial and noncommercial matters. 36 In
26. See Fischer, supra note 6, at 948.
27. Id
28. See Jean Heilman Grier, Providing for Arbitration in International Business
Transactions, 863 PRACTISING L. INST./CORP. L. 9, 18,24 (1994).
29. See Fischer, supra note 6, at 948.
30. See Volz, supra note 11, at 870.
31. See id. (detailing the consequences of enforceability of arbitration award).
32. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention].
33. See Volz, supra note 11, at 877.
34. See id. at 877-78. "Ratification" means the country approves and accepts the
treaty formally. Becoming a "signatory" means the country agrees to the terms of the
treaty. See id
35. See id
36. See id
365
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addition, the Convention "confers legitimacy upon awards granted
in any state, whether or not a contracting state, and whether or not
the parties are subject to the jurisdiction of different contracting
states."37
Although other significant conventions exist, they are
regional. For example, the European Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration (Geneva Convention) 38 addresses the
problems between the prior Communist-controlled countries of
the Eastern bloc and non-Communist European countries. 39 It is
therefore only applicable to countries in eastern and western
Europe.40
Another significant convention is the World Bank's
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes41 which
created the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID).42  ICSID helps resolve disputes between
foreign investors and host countries through conciliation and
arbitration. 43 Its objective is to "improve the investment climate
by creating facilities for voluntary settlement of investment
disputes through conciliation or arbitration proceedings to which a
host country would be party on equal procedural footing without
requiring or permitting intervention of investor's government" 44
Furthermore, many bilateral and multilateral treaties exist to
ensure final and binding international arbitral award. For
example, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 45
encourages Canada, Mexico, and the United States to have specific
legal procedures to enforce arbitration awards.46
Even with these different treaties, however, the host nation
still controls the enforcement of arbitration awards. This
37. Id at 878 (citing Cindy Silverstein, Iran Aircraft Industries v. Avco Corporation:
Was a Violation of Due Process Due?, 20 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 443,454 (1994)).
38. European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Apr. 21, 1961,
484 U.N.T.S. 349 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
39. See Geneva Convention, supra note 38, 484 U.N.T.S. at 350.
40. See Volz, supra note 11, at 877.
41. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575
U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
42. See Grier, supra note 28, at 35.
43. See id
44. Id. at 35-36.
45. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32
I.L.M. 289, 605.
46. See VoIz, supra note 11, at 885.
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discretion affects investors in several ways. Investors in a country
favoring arbitral awards and allowing their enforcement, will
encounter few problems. In some countries, however,
enforcement of an arbitral award may require additional time and
money because it may not take place until a local court gives
permission to execute the award.47  Countries with difficult
enforcement processes favor other means of dispute resolution
than arbitration.
In most Asian countries, arbitration is not the preferred
method of dispute resolution.48 For example, in the People's
Republic of China, the Chinese favor mediation or conciliation as
the favored method for resolving disputes.49 In Vietnam, the
Vietnamese parties generally prefer to settle disputes through
conciliation. 50  Although Asian countries may not prefer
arbitration, parties are still given the option to select it.
Nonetheless, even if the parties choose arbitration, these countries
may still elect not to enforce the arbitral judgment.51 Therefore,
the possibility of an enforceable arbitral award may depend largely
on the host country's government and its rules on enforcement of
arbitral awards. Accordingly, when entering an international
commercial transaction, foreign investors should be aware of the
host country's methods of dispute resolution and its political
environment.
III. DOING BUSINESS IN VIETNAM
A. Background
Imagine streets bustling with motorists, cyclists, and
pedestrians, all going in different directions. Imagine crowded
storefront shops offering a variety of goods and services,
everything from jewelry to mechanical repair. Imagine large
47. See id at 904. In the People's Republic of China, if the Chinese party loses and
refuses to comply with the arbitrator's award, the winning party must submit to the
People's Court to enforce the award. See id
48. See Burton, supra note 21, at 637-38.
49. See Volz, supra note 11, at 901. The Chinese rationale for preferring conciliation
is that "you suffer a little loss, and I suffer a little as well, and we are good friends." The
Chinese do not like adversarial dispute resolution proceedings. See id.
50. See Tim Tien-Chun Chang, Doing Business With Vietnam, 7 PRAC. LAW. 33, 39
(1994).
51. For example, the Chinese courts can refuse to enforce an arbitral award if the
parties meet one of the six conditions under Article 260 of the Arbitration Act. See Volz,
supra note 11, at 904.
367
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. [Vol. 20:361
advertisements of foreign products displayed throughout the urban
areas. Imagine vast construction projects ranging from remodeling
infrastructure to building new hotels. Imagine rich rice fields with
hardworking peasants gathering the grain. These are the images
that reflect modem Vietnam today.
Few would have visualized that Vietnam have evolved into
the growing market that it is today.52 After the fall of Saigon in
1975, Vietnam closed its doors to Western markets. 53 For decades
Vietnam isolated itself from foreign investors.54 This hesitation
was due to a history of foreign aggression and colonization, as well
as its twenty year devastating conflict with the United States from
the 1950s to the 1970s.
55
"After years of steadfast adherence to the Soviet economic
model and its dire consequences, Vietnam has finally realized that
foreign investment is an indispensable prerequisite to building and
developing its economy." 56 In 1986, the Vietnamese Communist
Party began improving foreign relations by implementing a series
52. Despite its problems, Vietnam has transformed itself with remarkable speed into
a booming marketplace. Hanoi and Saigon-drab backwaters only five years ago-are now
home to swank bistros, towering skyscrapers, well-stocked supermarkets, and yuppies
toting mobile telephones. GDP is expected to expand 8 to 12% every year for the
foreseeable future. Imports, $13 billion of which poured into the country last year [1996],
are growing at an annual rate of 30%. Mitchell, supra note 2, at 18.
53. See James Taylor, Jr., Vietnam: The Current Legal Environment for U.S.
Investors, 25 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 469, 469 (1994). "After the fall of Saigon in 1975,
the communist Vietnamese government sought to stifle the capitalistic business nature of
many South Vietnamese by condemning such behavior as subversive to the communist
model." Ngo, supra note 1, at 69.
54. Ngo, supra note 1, at 71-72.
55. "For nearly four decades, the regime was engaged in real war, as opposed to war
preparation." Nigel Harris & David Lockwood, The War-making State and Privatisation,
J. OF DEVEL. STUDIES (London), Jun. 1997, at 600. In 1857, a French military force
invaded Danang, Vietnam. A few years later, Vietnamese Emperor Tu Duc signed a
treaty giving the French government part of the Mekong Delta region. During World
War II (WWII), the Japanese occupied a major part of Vietnam. After WWII ended,
communist-dominated Viet Minh forces asserted control over the French, which led to a
temporary division of the country. In the early 1960s, the North Vietnamese Army began
to infiltrate into South Vietnam. Eventually, the United States sent troops to Vietnam,
marking the beginning of a long and devastating conflict between both countries. This
conflict lasted until Saigon surrendered to the North Vietnamese Army on April 30, 1975.
See JOSEPH BU'ITINGER, VIETNAM: A POLITICAL HISTORY 75-475 (1968).
56. Ngo, supra note 1, at 68 (1992). "The rigid move toward socialism led to a
disastrous collective harvest in 1982. 1d. at 68, n.8 (citing Chris Pritchard, Vietnam:
Welcoming a "Capitalist" Dawn, Bus. REV. WKLY., Nov. 8, 1991, available in LEXIS,
Asiapc Library, Vietnam File). "Socialism left Vietnam unable to provide food or other
essentials to meet its people's daily needs." Id. at 68, n.8 (citing The Legal System of
Vietnam, Foreign Investment Law, 9 Modern Legal Systems Cyclopedia 350.29-30).
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of economic reforms. 57 These reforms, known as "Doi Moi,"
attempted to transform Vietnam from a "centralized [system] to a
market economy." 58 One significant aspect of these reforms was
Vietnam's attempt to attract foreign investment by enacting laws
on tax, property, and the exploitation of natural resources. 59 Even
with these economic reforms, foreign investors expressed
hesitation, resulting largely from the U.S. trade embargo on
Vietnam.
The United States initially imposed the trade embargo on
North Vietnam in May 1964, when the United States supported
South Vietnam in its conflict against the Northern communist
guerrillas. 60 The embargo extended throughout Vietnam after the
fall of Saigon. 61 It prohibited persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction
including companies, citizens, and permanent residents, from
engaging directly or indirectly in any business or any other
transactions involving Vietnam. 62
On February 3, 1994, President Clinton improved relations
between the United States and Vietnam by easing the restrictions
of the trade embargo against Vietnam. 63 As a result, U.S.
57. See Luke McGrath, Note, Vietnam's Struggle to Balance Sovereignty,
Centralization, and Foreign Investment Under Doi Moi, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 2095
(1995).
58. Id. at 2096.
Communist Party Secretary-General Do Muoi appears to think that Vietnam
has had its fill of market reforms and wants a cooling-off period, but reform-
minded government officials and economists insist that stopping or slowing down
reforms at this juncture will stall the country's growth, increase its isolation and
maybe even threaten its stability.
Faith Keenan, What Economic Crisis, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW (Hong Kong),
Dec. 18, 1997, at 26-30.
Currently, the World Bank and others have been warning for more than a year
that the benefits of the first stage of doi moi ... are running thin. "A second
round of reforms is needed to sustain the growth trajectory they hope for and to
do that, especially in the present regional climate they will have to take some
bold steps indeed," says one multilateral lender.
Stier, supra note 3, at 30.
59. See McGrath, supra note 57, at 2096; see also Ngo, supra note 1, at 71. The
"general purposes behind the enactment of the 1987 [Foreign Investment Law] were to
expand economic cooperation with foreign countries, achieve domestic economic
development, and step up exports based on effective exploitation of natural resources,
manpower, and other potentialities." Id.
60. Ngo, supra note 1, at 83.
61. See Wunker, supra note 24, at 364 n.1.
62. See Taylor, supra note 53, at 471 (citing The Foreign Assets Control Regulations,
31 C.F.R. § 500.201(b)-(c) (1990) and 31 C.F.R. § 500.329(b)-(c) (1993)).
63. The Bush Administration initiated steps toward better relations with Vietnam.
The process of lifting the embargo began during the final months of the Bush
369
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businesses and citizens now have significant opportunities to
engage in trade and investment with Vietnam. Along with U.S.
investors, other foreign investors have poured into Vietnam.64
B. Investment Vehicles
Foreign investors may conduct business in Vietnam through
investment vehicles such as business cooperation contracts, joint
venture agreements, enterprises with one-hundred percent foreign
capital, or build-operate-transfer (B.O.T.) arrangements. 65  A
business cooperation contract exists when a Vietnamese partner
and a foreign investor jointly manage a business operation in
Vietnam, without creating a new business entity.66 A joint venture
agreement occurs when a foreign party contracts with one or more
Vietnamese parties, creating a separate business entity.67 One-
hundred percent foreign capital arrangement results when the
foreign investor exclusively owns and operates the capital of a
company in the host country.68 A B.O.T. arrangement occurs
when the foreign business person "contracts with the Vietnamese
government to construct an infrastructure project that must be
transferred to the Vietnamese government after completion. ' 69
Administration and the Clinton Administration completed the process in its first year.
See VIETNAM-U.S. RELATIONS: THE DEBATE OVER NORMALIZATION ISSUE BRIEF No.
IV92054 (Cong. Service, LOC, 1992); Steven A. Holmes, Clinton Takes 2nd Step to Ease
Ban on Trade with Vietnam, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1994, at A10. The embargo was eased,
but many sanctions remained in place. See id.
64. "After setting up shop in 1991, the Japanese trading giant quickly became one of
the country's most aggressive investors, importing high-quality products from Japan and
obtaining licenses in everything from auto-manufacturing to industrial parks." Mitchell,
supra note 2, at 19.
65. See Chang, supra note 50, at 34. "To fully penetrate the market, most executives
agree that they need a local manufacturing facility. 'To be a real player in Vietnam, you
eventually have to move to localized production.' Mobil Manchester says." Mitchell,
supra note 2, at 20.
66. See Chang, supra note 50, at 35.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. Id.
Previously, authorities only granted licenses to 100% foreign-owned projects if
they were in high priority industries. Now, even small investors have managed
to get by without a partner. [For example], Indochina Partners, a group of
entrepreneurs that have become among the most aggressive U.S. companies in
Vietnam, was recently allowed to establish a wholly owned juice canning
factories.
Mitchell, supra note 2, at 20.
Additionally, Vietnam is pushing ahead with its first major build-operate-
transfer (B.O.T.) power project, a $500 m gas-fired power station 50 km south-
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Foreign investors employ the joint venture vehicle most
frequently in Vietnam.70 The joint venture's advantages include
the shared allocation of risk between the foreign investor and the
local party, as well as benefits from the local government, such as
tax breaks. 71 Moreover, the foreign investor may have greater
access to less expensive materials, may obtain an abundance of
natural resources, and may recruit a large labor force. 72 The
disadvantages, however, are that the foreign investor may have to
contribute at least thirty percent of the capital, and plan for a joint
venture with a limited duration, usually fifty years.73  An
additional negative aspect is that a foreign investor may later
discover that he is not the only one who signed the contract with
the local partner.74
C. Government Officials
In addition to choosing a type of investment vehicle, foreign
investors must obtain approval from the appropriate governmental
authorities in Vietnam.75 Approval from officials of the State
Committee for Cooperation and Investment (SCCI) is the most
significant authorization. 76 The SCCI, a state agency in Vietnam,
is primary responsible for approving all applications for foreign
investment.77 Without its approval, foreign investors are not
east of Ho Chi Minh City. On a smaller scale, Hanoi has awarded a $120 m
B.O.T. project-a diesel engine dual fuel power project in Ba Ria, in Vung Tua to
Finland's Wartsila USD Corporation.
Vietnam's B.O. T. Deals Make Progress, INT'L TRADE FIN. (London), Nov. 7, 1997, at 4.
70. See F. Gale Connor, Vietnam" Trading with the Enemy or Investing in the Future?,
25 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 481,483 (1994).
71. See id at 484. "A good Vietnamese joint-venture partner can help navigate the
waters." Mitchell, supra note 2, at 20.
72. See Connor, supra note 70, at 484.
73. See Ngo, supra note 1, at 68. For example, "the 1977 foreign investment law
required that a foreign partner's investment share be a minimum of 30% and no greater
than 49%. The 1987 Law on Foreign Investment [however] places no limit on the
maximum amount of capital contributed by a foreign partner in a joint venture." Id. at
n.7 (citing The Legal System of Vietnam, Foreign Investment Law, 9 Modern Legal
Systems Cyclopedia 350.31).
74. See Mitchell, supra note 2. at 20 (stating that there are stories in Saigon and
Hanoi of Vietnamese companies signing identical contracts).
75. See Taylor, supra note 53, at 474. "Requiring that all foreign investment projects
obtain approval . . . prior to commencement . . . causes delays, generates excessive
bureaucracy, and leads to corruption." Ngo, supra note 1, at 94.
76. See Taylor, supra note 53, at 473.
77. See id
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issued a license, and thus, not allowed to invest in Vietnam.78
The SCCI considers all aspects of the intended business
investment, including the proposed investment contract, the
economic and technical feasibility studies, and the legal, financial,
and technical status of the parties.79  Because the Foreign
Investment Law (FIL) in Vietnam provides no specific guidelines,
the SCCI has complete discretion "in granting investment licenses
and preferential treatment" to foreign investors.80 Within three
months from receiving the application for foreign investment, the
SCCI must notify the applicant of its decision. 81 If the SCCI issues
a license, the foreign investor has thirty days to publish certain
project details in a local or central daily newspaper.
82
In addition to receiving the SCCI's approval, foreign investors
must receive permission from other significant governmental
entities. 83 Many Vietnamese ministries have as much influence as
the SCCI officials. Moreover, a specific ministry is responsible for
each area of investment. 84 These distinct ministries review the
proposed investments and evaluate their social and economic
impact.85 The Vietnamese Ministry of Finance, for example,
approves the monetary unit to be used in bookkeeping, whether in
Vietnamese currency (dong) or a foreign currency.8 6
D. Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam
To be a successful investor in Vietnam requires that one be
78. See Wunker, supra note 24, at 365.
79. See REGULATIONS IN DETAIL FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW ON
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN VIETNAM, DECREE No. 18-CP arts. 9, 10, 20, 21, 22, 46, 47, 48
(Vietnam) [hereinafter 1993 REGULATIONS]. "The feasibility study [in Vietnam] should
include the following: an explanation of the company structure; names and nationalities of
officers; an explanation of how profits will be allocated; environmental statement; and
types of governmental assistance required." Chang, supra note 50, at 37.
80. Protection, supra note 5, at 2004.
81. See 1993 REGULATIONS, supra note 79, arts. 11, 23.
82. See id arts. 12, 24, 49. One detail that should be published is the form of
investment vehicle used. See Protection, supra note 5, at 2004.
83. "Even after receiving an investment license, foreign companies must obtain a
myriad of additional permits. One executive in Saigon was required to obtain permission
to build a manufacturing plant in Dong Nai province from not only 3 ministries in Hanoi,
but also the Ho Chi Minh City People's Committee." Mitchell, supra note 2, at 20.
"Approval from numerous officials is needed for many minor business activities and, with
many competitors for few promotions, there is intense skirmishing within the
bureaucracy." Stier, supra note 3, at 34.
84. See Wunker, supra note 24, at 368.
85. See id
86. See 1993 REGULATIONS, supra note 79, art. 87.
[Vol. 20:361
1998] Vietnam: Can an Effective Arbitration System Exist?
familiar and understand Vietnam's law on foreign investment.
The 8th Legislature of the National Assembly of the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam first enacted the Foreign Investment Law
(FIL)87 on December 29, 1987, during the economic reform period
of "Doi Moi. ''88  The National Assembly issued further
amendments to the FIL in 1990 and 1992.89 Most recently, on
April 16, 1993, the government announced as Decree Number 18-
CP, the Regulation in Detail for the Implementation of the Law
on Foreign Investment in Vietnam (1993 Regulations). 90
The FIL and the 1993 Regulations dictate the investment
vehicles, the responsibilities of the SCCI, and other investment
procedures required in Vietnam. 91 Moreover, the FIL and 1993
Regulations provide investment protections to foreign investors.
92
For example, Vietnam's FIL specifically prohibits the confiscation
and expropriation of foreign investors' capital and assets, and
affirms that the Vietnamese government will not nationalize
enterprises with foreign-owned capital. 93  Despite these
protections, foreign investors should be aware that Vietnam has a
Communist regime94 and is highly nationalistic. 95 Therefore,
foreign investors should consider seeking outside protection for
87. LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN VIETNAM, Dec. 29, 1987, reprinted in 30
I.L.M. 930 (1991) [hereinafter FILl.
88. See Ngo, supra note 1, at 68. The Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam is a
"bold revision of the original Decree on Foreign Investment enacted in 1977 by the
Communist Party." Id at 68 (citing Gary Vause, Doing Business with Vietnam-Prospects
and Concerns for the 1990s, 4 FLA. INT'L L.J. 231, 252-53).
89. LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT WITH AMENDMENTS & ADDITIONS, June 30,
1990; LAW ON AMENDMENT OF AN ADDITION TO A NUMBER OF ARTICLES OF THE LAW
ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN VIETNAM, Dec. 23, 1992.
90. 1993 REGULATIONS, supra note 79.
91. See Protection, supra note 5, at 2003-05.
92. See FIL, supra note 87, art. 20, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. at 933; 1993 REGULATIONS,
supra note 79, art. 99. The Government of Vietnam guarantees appropriate and equal
treatment to all foreign organizations and individuals investing in Vietnam in accordance
to the Law on Foreign Investment. Any treaty on investment incentives and protection
signed by the Government of Vietnam with the government of another country shall
prevail with its agreements. 1993 REGULATIONS, supra note 79, at art. 99.
93. See FIL, supra note 87, arts. 21, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. at 934. Expropriation is
one way the country can deprive foreign investors of their interests. A country can
expropriate in two ways: "outright expropriation" occurs when the state takes physical
possession of the investor's business, and "creeping expropriation" occurs when the
country adds burdensome regulations which can eventually prevent an investor from
operating his business profitably. See RALPH H. FOLSOM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS: A PROBLEM ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 1018-1056 (3d ed. 1995).
94. See Ngo, supra note 1, at 69.
95. See Stier, supra note 3, at 34.
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their investments, such as political risk insurance. 96
Political risk insurance protects investors against
noncommercial or political risks.97 If expropriation occurs, the
insurance scheme would "indemnif[y] the investor, and [subrogate]
the investor's claim against the host state as its own to seek
reimbursement. ' 98 Other significant insurance schemes include
the United States Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC) and the World Bank's Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency (MIGA). 99 OPIC, however, will not be available for
foreign investors in Vietnam until the United States and Vietnam
have fully restored diplomatic relations.100 Nonetheless, Vietnam
is in the process of joining MIGA, which offers insurance against
inconvertibility of currency, expropriation, breach of contract, war
and civil disturbance, and breach of contract. 101
In addition to guarding against expropriation, the FIL also
attempts to secure foreign investment against the risk of adverse
changes in law.102 Due to Vietnam's evolving legal system, the
1992 Amendment to the FIL provides that if any change in the law
occurs which may harm the interests of foreign investors, Vietnam
will use adequate measures to protect investors' interests. 103
The clauses in the FIL depict Vietnam as a low risk country
that is taking great measures to safeguard foreign investors. The
FIL, however, reflects a "curious dichotomy."'104  Although
Vietnam's FIL extends further than most other developing
countries in protecting against expropriation and subsequent
changes in law, Vietnam does not seem to follow the current
worldwide trend in dispute resolution, especially international
arbitration.10 5 Foreign investors will not be completely protected
unless arbitration becomes available. Thus, Vietnam's attitude
toward international arbitration concerns foreign investors.
96. See Taylor, supra note 53, at 474.
97. See Protection, supra note 5, at 2002.
98. Id. at 2002 n.51.
99. See id at 2002.
100. See Taylor, supra note 53, at 474.
101. See id.
102. See Protection, supra note 5, at 2005-06.
103. See id
104. 1d at 2012.
105. See id.
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IV. VIETNAM'S DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM
The 1993 Regulation sets forth the specific method of dispute
resolution allowed for each type of business investment. 106 For
instance, if a dispute arises between a foreign-invested party and a
Vietnamese governmental agency in a contractual business
cooperation agreement, conciliation is required.10 7 If conciliation
fails, then "a competent authority," which the 1993 Regulations
does not clearly define, would decide the case.108 The 1993
Regulations do not allow any other means of dispute resolution
under those circumstances. 10 9
Although Vietnamese law does not address the issue of
arbitration between foreign investors and the Vietnamese
government, parties can choose to arbitrate in other business
situations.110  For example, Vietnam's FIL and the 1993
Regulations allow international arbitration as an alternative
dispute resolution for foreign and Vietnamese parties in a joint
venture or a contractual business cooperation agreement. 111 The
parties, however, must initially try to resolve their dispute through
negotiation and conciliation before using arbitration.
112
Vietnam's attitude toward dispute resolution is similar to
other Asian countries influenced by Confucian values.
113
Vietnamese people prefer to settle disputes through conciliation
rather than through a confrontational dispute resolution
process. 114 If conciliation fails, then the Vietnamese parties prefer
to have the Vietnamese courts settle the dispute. 115 To many
106. See Wunker, supra note 24, at 381.
107. See 1993 REGULATIONS, supra note 79, art. 102.
10& See Wunker, supra note 24, at 382.
109. See id.
110. See Protection, supra note 5, at 2007.
111. See id.; see also Wunker, supra note 24, at 382.
112. See Wunker, supra note 24, at 382.
113. See Chang, supra note 50, at 39. "In the Confucian tradition, parties conduct
business on a friendly basis within the cultural ethic of Li (peace, harmony, and
conciliation), not Fa (strict application of legal rules)." Burton, supra note 21, at 638 n.1.
Therefore, countries that follow the concept of traditional Confucianism desire to
maintain their relationship. Accordingly, they prefer discussion and compromise over
litigation. See M. Scott Donahey, Seeking Harmony-Is the Asian Concept of the
Conciliator/Arbitrator Applicable in the West?, Disp. RESOL. J., Apr.-June 1995, at 74, 74.
Mediation and conciliation represent the predominant forms of civil and commercial
dispute settlement for both international and domestic matters in the People's Republic
of China. See Volz, supra note 11, at 901-02.
114. See Chang, supra note 50, at 39.
115. See id.
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foreign investors, however, there is only a remote possibility of
Vietnamese judges deciding complicated issues of foreign
transactions in a fair and unbiased manner.11 6 For this reason,
foreign investors prefer arbitration.11 7 Investors usually choose an
international arbitrator from a third country, or select an
arbitration panel located in a foreign forum." 8 Foreign investors
generally find these alternatives more appealing than a
Vietnamese judicial settlement." 9
A. The Ineffectiveness of International Aribitration in Vietnam
One downfall of not litigating or arbitrating in Vietnam is that
there is no guarantee of enforcement of a foreign arbitration
award. 120 If the government or a local court does not enforce the
arbitration award, the award is worthless. Unpredictable or lack of
local enforcement practices support the notion that an effective
arbitration system cannot exist in Vietnam.
Several reasons influence the Vietnamese government's or a
local court's decision to not enforce an arbitration award. First,
Vietnam's decision not to enforce international arbitration awards
may be due partly to its perception of international arbitration as
biased. Vietnam's view of arbitration as biased may be similar to
that of many Latin American countries based on their reliance on
the "Calvo Doctrine."'121  Under the Calvo Doctrine, Latin
American countries believed that foreign investors should not be
entitled to greater rights than those available to their nationals.122
Therefore, any form of dispute resolution should be under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the host state's domestic courts and
governed by national laws. International courts and international
laws should not play a part in the host state's domestic affairs.123
In addition, these Latin American countries hesitate to submit
116. See i.
117. See id.
118. See id
119. See id
120. See id. Like in China, "foreign parties should be prepared for the risk that local
courts will reach verdicts on the recognition of foreign awards, which may be self-serving
and entirely different from the outcome of previous international arbitration proceeding."
Fear China, supra note 23, at 40.
121. See Protection, supra note 5, at 1997. An Argentinean jurist, Carlos Calvo,
developed the Calvo Doctrine during the last part of the nineteenth century. See id. at
1997 n.23.
122. See id.
123. See id.
[Vol. 20:361376
1998] Vietnam: Can an Effective Arbitration System Exist? 377
their disputes to international arbitration because they found it
biased against developing countries. 124 As a developing country
beginning to participate actively in international commerce,
Vietnam also perceives international arbitration as possibly biased
against developing countries. 125 Furthermore, Vietnam perceives
international arbitration as a "'foreign' process and an
infringement upon national sovereignty.' 1 26
The second reason for Vietnam's non-enforcement of an
arbitral award may be due to Vietnam's lack of an enforcement
law.1 27 Vietnam's foreign investment laws rarely provide adequate
security for the recognition of foreign arbitration awards.
Additionally, neither the FIL nor the 1993 Regulations encourage
international arbitration as the initial means of dispute
resolution.128 Vietnam's policy is apparently that only its courts
should make decisions regarding business contracts in the
country. 129
The most significant reason for Vietnam's non-enforcement of
an arbitral award is government instability. In Vietnam, the
government may choose not to recognize certain clauses, such as
an arbitration clause in a foreign investment contract. 130 For
example, assume a foreign investor and a Vietnamese party or the
Vietnamese government enter into a business contract which has
an arbitration clause. If either party breaches the contract, the
parties will arbitrate. In many cases, however, the arbitrator's
decision is meaningless because the Vietnamese authorities may
decide not to fulfill their contractual obligation or comply with the
award. The Vietnamese authorities may decide instead to extort
money from the foreign investor to enforce the award. 131 In the
event of extortion, the Vietnamese officials may still decide not to
comply with the arbitrator's award. 132 One U.S. businessman
referred to investment contracts in Vietnam as "water soluble
glue."'1 33  This situation exemplifies Vietnam's unstable
124. See id at 2002.
125. See id. at 2008.
126. Id. at 2007.
127. See PELL, supra note 8, at 9.
128. See Wunker, supra note 24, at 382.
129. See Protection, supra note 5, at 2007.
130. See PELL, supra note 8, at 9.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. Id.
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government system and its effect on international arbitration.
One measure Vietnam has taken toward international
arbitration is enacting bilateral treaties (BITs) with selected
countries.134 Through the BITs, Vietnam allows foreign investors
to use international arbitration, even in business investments with
Vietnamese governmental agencies. 135 This provision contradicts
the 1993 Regulations, which do not allow international arbitration
as an option in contracts with the Vietnamese government.
136
Nonetheless, the FIL and the 1993 Regulations provide that "[a]ny
treaty on investment incentives and protection signed by the
Government of Vietnam with the government of another country
shall prevail with its agreement. ' 137 Therefore, the BITs do have
some validity.
One significant advantage of a BIT is that it strengthens the
enforcement process of an arbitration award. For example, if
Vietnam fails to enforce an arbitration award, it may detrimentally
affect its relationship with the country that signed the treaty.
138
The BITs, however, are only made with select countries. They are
not reassurance to foreign investors from countries that do not
have BITs with Vietnam, such as the United States. 139
Therefore, due to Vietnam's distrust of arbitration, its lack of
legal enforcement, corruption in the government, and significantly
low numbers of BITs, effective arbitration cannot exist. The
Vietnamese government must change its attitude toward
international arbitration and deal with enforcement of arbitral
awards for an effective arbitration system to exist.
134. See id. at 2008 n.102. "The Australia-Vietnam BIT allows arbitration before
either ICSID, or by agreement before an arbitral authority." Agreement on the
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Mar. 5, 1991, Austl.-Vietnam, art.
12, 1991, Austl. T.S. No. 36. "The China-Vietnam BIT allows arbitration before a
tribunal appointed by the parties." Agreement Concerning the Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Dec. 2, 1992, P.R.C.-Vietnam, art. 8, §§ 3-4.
135. See Protection, supra note 5, at 2008.
136. See id. at 2007. Both the FIL & 1993 Regulations have provisions for
international arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution for businesses between
foreign investors and Vietnamese parties to a joint venture. Nonetheless, the FIL is silent
on dispute resolution between foreign investors and the Vietnamese government, and the
1993 Regulations require that disputes between such parties be brought before a
Government competent authority. See id
137. 1993 REGULATIONS, supra note 79, art. 99.
138. See Protection, supra note 5, at 2007.
139. See id
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V. PREPARATION FOR AN INEFFECTIVE ARBITRATION SYSTEM IN
VIETNAM
A foreign investor in Vietnam should always prepare for the
possibility that Vietnam may not enforce the investor's arbitration
award. There are a few ways a foreign investor may prepare for a
possibly unenforceable arbitration award.
First, foreign investor should seek as much governmental
involvement as possible. The more the government is involved,
"the easier [it is] to approach the government for assistance if
investments are threatened.' 140 Furthermore, the government
may hasten the approval process and help the investor identify
potential problems in the investment. 141 Moreover, governmental
officials may provide guidance on the effectiveness of the
proposed dispute mechanism. 142 For example, the State Economic
Arbitration Committee has the express authority to execute laws
relating to economic contracts and economic arbitration. 143 By
dealing with the governmental officials on a cordial level, the
foreign investor may reduce the possibility of bribery or extortion.
In addition, working closely with the government officials
increases the likelihood of enforcement of an arbitration award.
Second, the foreign investor should draft a proper investment
contract. This is essential to negotiate a detailed written
agreement. 144 Most important, the foreign investor must include a
provision specifying the applicable dispute resolution
mechanism. 145 If a valid arbitration clause is carefully drafted,
enforcement presents little difficulty because parties will usually
abide by the arbitration awards. 146 Necessary elements in an
enforceable arbitrable agreement include: (1) a broad and
arbitrable subject matter under local law; (2) capacity of the
parties to contract when they agree to arbitrate; (3) the arbitrator
or arbitration panel must have been decided in advance; (4)
existence of a choice of law clause; (5) previously decided location
of where the arbitration takes place; and (6) a set of rules to
140. Taylor, supra note 53, at 474.
141. See id
142. See id at 478.
143. See id.
144. See Chang, supra note 50, at 35.
145. See Taylor, supra note 53, at 478.
146. See Fischer, supra note 6, at 961.
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govern the arbitration established in advance, such as the
institutional rules or the ad hoc rules.
147
Third, the foreign investor should be prepared for the losing
party to refuse to honor the award even with a well drafted
arbitration agreement. For example, if arbitration is the preferred
method of dispute resolution, but the Vietnamese party or
government does not recognize the award, the contract should
specify a second preferred dispute resolution process. The foreign
investor should expect the possibility of resorting to conciliation or
mediation, which is often the favorable form of dispute settlement
for the Vietnamese government.148
One way to mitigate the consequences of an unenforced
arbitration award in Vietnam is by obtaining non-commercial risk
insurance from entities, such as MIGA. If the Vietnamese
government fails to enforce the arbitration award, an insurance
policy can compensate the investors. 149
Fourth, the foreign investor should attempt to understand and
accommodate cultural differences to avoid investment problems
and ensure enforcement. 150  A foreign investor may create
problems and tensions with local investors and officials if he is not
sensitive to Vietnamese customs and culture. 151 Also, a foreigner
should not be ignorant, but accommodate the differences in the
Vietnamese work ethic, lifestyle, and daily activities. It is
beneficial, therefore, to engage the services of a local legal adviser
during negotiations and other aspects of the business
transaction. 152 A local adviser is more familiar with the way the
business should be run in Vietnam and can more effectively handle
the loopholes a foreign investor must overcome. Additionally, a
local adviser may be able to push for enforcement of the arbitral
147. See Grier, supra note 28, at 25-32; see also Fischer, supra note 6, at 961.
148. See Chang, supra note 50, at 39.
149 See Protection, supra note 5, at 2001-02.
150. See Chang, supra note 50, at 38.
151. See id.
For maintaining good relationships with a foreign country, it goes without saying
that respect for its culture and understanding of its people's unique
sentimentality and customs should be a basis. In June of [1997], when a deputy
director of the Vietnamese ministry of labor was invited to Korea . . .in his
speech, he warned: "Korean companies need to observe the Vietnamese labor
law, and managers and officials in charge in particular should get thoroughly
acquainted with our culture, tradition and customs, which will help prevent the
failures of Korean investors in Vietnam.
Troubled Investments, Bus. KOREA (Seoul), Oct. 1997, at 18.
152. See Chang, supra note 50, at 38
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award, without creating further tension with the Vietnamese
government.
VI. STEPS TOWARD AN EFFECTIVE ARBITRATION SYSTEM
Although the foreign investor may take steps to protect
himself from the possibility of an unenforced arbitral award, these
steps may not be enough to soothe his fear of investing in
Vietnam. Vietnam must take extra measures to improve its
relationships with foreign investors.153 Implementing measures to
reduce expropriation is one positive step. These measures,
however, are not sufficient. 154 To reassure the foreign investors,
Vietnam needs an effective arbitration system.
Thus, Vietnam must change its policy regarding international
arbitration by moving away from the Calvo Doctrine and toward a
willingness to enforce arbitral awards. Several solutions exist to
aid Vietnam in developing a more effective arbitration system.
A. Uncitral's Model Law
First, Vietnam should consider adopting the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model
Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Model Law) as a
standard for enforcement of arbitral awards. 155  The United
Nations passed this model in 1985, to create uniform arbitration
laws and to assist developing countries with arbitration laws.156 It
particularly focuses on providing for a uniform enforcement of
arbitral awards.157 It attempts to limit the role of local courts in
153. Authorities have shown other signs that Vietnam is willing to yield to foreign
investor's demands. Stemming in part from a proposal by the American
Chamber of Commerce, the government revised a law which had allowed
Vietnamese partners, no matter how small their share, to veto joint venture
decisions. In response to complaints from other foreign executives, Hanoi also
changed the investment code to allow companies to deduct interest payment for
tax purposes. Officials have even gone so far as to solicit recommendations from
foreign companies before drafting new policies.
Mitchell, supra note 2, at 20.
154. See FIL, supra note 87, art 20, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. at 933; 1993 REGULATIONS,
supra note 79, art. 99.
155. UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, U.N. GAOR,
40th Sess., Supp. No. 17, Annex I, at 81, U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (1985), reprinted in 24 I.L.M.
1302.
156. See Kenneth T. Ungar, Note, The Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Under
UNCITRAL's Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 25 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 717,719 (1987).
157. See id.
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international arbitration.158 Although the New York Convention
is one effective method to assure the recognition and enforcement
of foreign arbitral awards, it has not yet been ratified by all
countries. 159 Vietnam, for example, has neither signed nor ratified
this treaty.160
The Model Law provides three approaches for the winning
party if the losing party fails to comply with the arbitrator's
decision. 161 First, the winning party should put pressure on the
losing party by stating that it is in the party's best interest to
perform the award or risk losing future business with the winning
party.162 If that is unsuccessful, the next step is to compel the
losing party to pay or risk adverse publicity.163 If the losing party
has a successful business and is concerned with negative press
coverage, it may comply with the arbitration award. 164 If both
steps fail, the final approach is to seek court intervention through
the country's judicial system. 165 The court may force the party to
adhere to the award.166
In the arbitration enforcement proceedings, domestic courts
in each country have different procedures and levels of control.167
Their performance depends on the arbitration rules of the
particular country. 168 Some countries enforce the award with little
or no judicial intervention, while other countries require the
parties to reargue the entire claim in the court.169
The Model Law has been successful in countries that have
adopted either it or a similar version. 170 Hong Kong, for example,
has adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law and is the leading
arbitrating site in the Asia-Pacific region. 171  Singapore and
Malaysia have also adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law, and are
158. See Craig, supra note 19, at 26.
159. See Volz, supra note 11, at 887.
160. See id. at 940.
161. See idU at 887.
162. See iii
163. See id. at 887-88.
164. See id
165. See id.
166. See idL at 888.
167. See id at 871.
168. See id at 888.
169. See id
170. See Craig, supra note 19, at 55.
171. See id.
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leading candidates as neutral arbitration sites in that region. 172 In
short, success often depends on the individual country's willingness
to change its arbitration laws to meet the standard of the Model
Law.173 For countries, such as Vietnam, which have little or no
enforcement procedures for arbitration awards, the effect of
adopting the Model Law would be advantageous to their position
in the Asian market.
1. Judicial Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
Currently, Vietnam has little or no guideline for judicial
enforcement of arbitral awards. 174 In addition, none of Vietnam's
current laws reflect any positive attitudes regarding arbitration.
175
Many courts may still adhere to the Calvo Doctrine and may
refuse to enforce arbitration awards against its own government or
business people.
If judicial intervention is necessary, Vietnam should include
procedural rules to give its courts definite guidelines to follow in
their decision to enforce arbitral awards. For example, Vietnam
should adopt measures as seen in the People's Republic of China
(PRC). PRC has adopted the Arbitration Act of The People's
Republic of China, which came into effect on September 1,
1995.176 The Act provides procedures toward a more fair, efficient
dispute resolution. Article 260 specifically provides six conditions
which Chinese courts can refuse to enforce an award. 177 As a
result, the Vietnamese courts have legitimate reasons to compel
the losing party to perform the award.
2. Amendment of Vietnam's Foreign Investment Law
If Vietnam incorporates UNCITRAL's Model Law,
enforcement of awards may be further guaranteed. Vietnam
should amend its investment laws, such as the FIL, to reflect the
principles embodied in the Model Law. Vietnam should revise its
law on international arbitration more favorable to foreigners, and
reduce local courts' supervision over the recognition and
172. See id
173. See id.
174. See Wunker, supra note 24, at 381.
175. See id.
176. The Arbitration Act is modeled after UNCITRAL and is highly responsive to
foreign investors in China. See Volz, supra note 11, at 904.
177. See Volz, supra note 11, at 904.
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enforcement of foreign awards.
Therefore, Vietnam should consent to international
arbitration in its FIL, as seen in its BITs with selected countries.
178
Vietnam should revise the law to have fewer restrictions and
formalities so that enforcing the arbitral award is easier. Vietnam
should follow countries, such as Malaysia, in amending its
arbitration system. Kuala Lumpur has a committee administering
international arbitration under UNCITRAL rules. Under
Malaysian law, an award rendered under those rules is final and
binding, without resorting to Malaysian courts for enforcement.
179
B. Other Steps Vietnam Should Take to Become the Dominant
Actor in the Asian Market
In addition to amending its investment laws to reflect
UNCITRAL Model Law, Vietnam should form more BITs with
capital exporting countries, such as the United States. In these
BITs, Vietnam should specifically consent to international
arbitration. The BITs would assure foreign investors that a closer
relationship exists between their home countries and Vietnam and
thus, enforcement of arbitration awards would be more assured.
In the absence of a BIT, however, investors currently have little
legal ammunition to bring to Vietnamese courts to ensure fair
treatment and protection under international law.
Vietnam should also consider joining more multilateral
international conventions. Specifically, Vietnam should ratify the
New York Convention to demonstrate its willingness to cooperate
and work with other nations in recognizing foreign arbitral awards.
In addition, Vietnam may opt for the reciprocity reservation under
the New York Convention. 180 This clause would allow Vietnam to
recognize only foreign arbitration awards granted by an arbitration
body from countries ratifying the New York Convention. 181
178. See Protection, supra note 5, at 2008 n.102.
179. See Craig, supra note 19, at 56. Thailand is another country that Vietnam should
look at in creating its own model. Thailand has opened an arbitration office in the
Ministry of Justice. This office allows businesses to resolve their disputes in a neutral
place than resorting to the Thai judicial system. See Jahan P. Raissi, Arbitrating in
Thailand, 16 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 99, 100 (1992).
180. See New York Convention, supra note 32, art. 1(3), 21 U.S.T. at 2519. Section
three provides: "When signing, ratifying, or acceding to this Convention, or notifying
extension under article X hereof, any State may on the basis of reciprocity declare that it
will apply the Convention to the recognition and enforcement of awards made only in the
territory of another Contracting State .... " Id.
181. See id.
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If Vietnam chooses not to officially ratify the Convention, it
can become a signatory. As a signatory, the Vietnamese
government would generally be required to abide by its terms.182
The failure to abide by the terms of the Conventions may have a
detrimental effect on Vietnam's position as a growing market, but
would not subject Vietnam to enforcement procedures.
If Vietnam chooses neither to ratify nor become a signatory to
the Convention, it should consider modifying its current dispute
resolution mechanisms. Vietnam, therefore, should consider
combining conciliation with arbitration. 183 Its current method of
conciliation alone is not completely satisfactory because the
agreement settlement is not final and binding, and rules do not
exist that specify a conciliator's duties in detail.184  The
combination of conciliation and arbitration would satisfy both the
Asian parties' desire for harmony and the foreign investor's
preference for arbitration. 185
A number of ways to structure the combination of conciliation
and arbitration exist.186  Parties can, for example, agree to
eliminate all references regarding dispute resolution from the
contract. When a dispute arises, the parties may then agree to first
conciliate before using arbitration. 187 If parties want an advance
agreement, however, they may have two options in combining
conciliation and arbitration. 188
One option is to blend conciliation rules with arbitration
rules.189 In one proceeding, the tribunal would act as both
conciliator and arbitrator.190 In addition, the tribunal may choose
182. See id. art. VIII(l), 21 U.S.T. at 2521.
183. The People's Republic of China is one the foremost proponent of this practice.
Although no written rules or prescribed practice exist, Chinese arbitrators practice the
combination of mediation and conciliation. See Donahey, supra note 113, at 75. A
combined mediation/arbitration is unique to the PRC, and is often applied to foreign-
related disputes, as defined under the Foreign Economic Contract Law. Edward HW
Chan, Amicable Dispute Resolution in the PRC and its Implication for Foreign-Related
Construction Disputes, CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT & ECONOMICS, Nov. 1997, at 539-
48.
184. See Burton, supra note 21, at 638-39.
185. See id. at 638.
186. See id. at 639.
187. See id. at 642.
18& See id.
189. See id.
190. See id. at 653. For example, the China International Economic and Trade
Association's (CIETAC) Arbitration Tribunal may conciliate cases in the process of
arbitration. In addition, the arbitrator may become a conciliator, then become an
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to use whatever conciliation rules and arbitration rules are
appropriate under the circumstances. 191
The second option is to combine conciliation and arbitration
in a two-step process. 192 The parties may resort to arbitration only
after the conciliation is concluded, however, the arbitration
remains a separate proceeding. 193 This means that different
people are employed as conciliator and arbitrator, and statements
made or information gained during conciliation may not be used in
the arbitration. 1
94
Whatever method the parties choose to combine conciliation
and arbitration, whether or not in an advance agreement, depends
upon the situations of their businesses. 195 The important thing is
for the parties to consider that both conciliation and arbitration
are alternatives for effective dispute resolution.196
VII. CONCLUSION
To place itself at the forefront of the Asian market, Vietnam
has taken initial steps to gain the confidence of the foreign
investors. It has succeeded in creating laws that are workable and
favorable to foreign investors. Nonetheless, Vietnam fails to fully
embrace the international norms governing dispute resolution. 197
It still needs to develop a more efficient system for settling
disputes, in particular its arbitration system.
Under its current dearth of legal enforcement, significantly
low numbers of BITs, and instability in the government, an
effective arbitration system, however, cannot exist. An effective
arbitral system is necessary to maintain a positive business
atmosphere. There are certain measures that Vietnam may
arbitrator again at any stage of the proceedings. See Donahey, supra note 113, at 75.
191. See Burton, supra note 21, at 653.
192. See id at 642.
193. See id at 657.
194. See id. There are some risks that parties, who conciliate in good faith, may impair
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conciliation proceeding from the arbitration one. See id at 644.
195. See id. at 657.
196. See id "One of the subjects addressed at the 1996 Arbitration Conference was
the relationship between arbitration and conciliation in the resolution of international
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separately." Michael Hoellering, Mediation & Arbitration, A Growing Interaction, 52
DIsP. RESOL. J. 23,23-25 (1997).
197. See Protection, supra note 5, at 2012.
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consider to amend its laws regarding arbitration. If Vietnam
exerts the extra effort to amend its arbitration laws, it may emerge
at the forefront of the Asian market.
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